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Text
[*3]
I. Introduction
As members of the ABA Antitrust Section's Task Force on Fundamental Theory, we are pleased to provide a brief
discussion of the appropriate role of market concentration in the review of mergers under the antitrust laws. This
paper, organized in four main parts, will offer some suggestions for revising the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines. A final section of this work will analyze whether it would be
preferable to conduct merger analysis by applying Professor Michael E. Porter's business strategy framework rather
than the Merger Guidelines.
[*4]
II. What is the current role of concentration in merger analysis?
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Market concentration is but one factor of many relevant to merger analysis under the current approach of the
courts and the federal enforcement agencies. That approach derives originally from United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, in which the Supreme Court held that high and increasing market concentration resulting from a
merger creates a presumption that the transaction is anticompetitive. 1 Subsequent cases have shown that this
presumption could be triggered by concentration levels that are low by present-day standards, and, once invoked,
the presumption was in practice impossible to overcome. 2
In the past twenty-five years, the virtually irrebuttable presumption of harm from increases in concentration - applied
in the 1960s cases - has been significantly weakened. In the mid-1970s, in United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., the Supreme Court made clear that the Philadelphia National Bank presumption (or "structural presumption")
was rebuttable. 3 But that decision arguably did no more than "carve [a] limited exception[] to the broad holdings of
some of the merger decisions of the 1960s." 4
More recent lower court merger decisions go further than General Dynamics in backing away from the 1960s cases.
The modern decisions recognize that antitrust's Chicago school revolution, and the contemporary focus on "the
economic concept of competition, rather than any desire to preserve rivals as such" can be understood to "cast
doubt on the continued vitality" of older decisions such as Von's Grocery. 5 As a consequence, the courts now treat
the structural presumption as rebuttable, and are not reluctant to find it rebutted in fact.
[*5] The leading contemporary decision describing the framework for horizontal merger analysis is United States v.
Baker Hughes Inc. 6 Although Baker Hughes recognizes the presumption that a merger among significant
competitors will raise prices, the decision invites lower courts to undertake a wide-ranging and thorough economic
analysis of the likely competitive effects of the transaction, in which market concentration is just one of many
relevant factors. The opinion explains:
Section 7 involves probabilities, not certainties or possibilities. The Supreme Court has adopted a totality-of-thecircumstances approach to the statute, weighing of a variety of factors to determine the effects of particular
transactions on competition. That the government can establish a prima facie case through evidence on only one
factor, market concentration … simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future
competitiveness… 7
The D.C. Circuit's most recent antitrust merger decision, in Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
emphasizes the continued role of concentration in horizontal merger analysis while still confirming that the structural
presumption is rebuttable. 8 Consistent with Baker Hughes, the Heinz panel expressly rejected the FTC's

1

See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).

2

See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); see also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966); but cf. U.S. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.Cir. 1990); U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534
(N.D.Ill. 1972).
3

See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).

4

See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986)(Posner, J.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).

5

Id.

6

United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.Cir. 1990). Two members of the unanimous appellate panel have
since been elevated to the Supreme Court: Clarence Thomas (who authored the opinion) and Ruth B. Ginsburg.
7

Id. at 984 (footnote omitted).
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contention that high concentration in a market with entry barriers alone entitles the government to a preliminary
injunction. 9 The Heinz court accepted the notion that a successful rebuttal requires evidence that the market share
statistics provide "an inaccurate account of the [merger's] probable effects on competition," 10 and even recognized
the possibility that, on other facts, an efficiencies defense could prevail. 11
[*6] Yet Heinz also decisively rejected the view that concentration is irrelevant once the merging firms proffer
evidence to rebut the government's prima facie case. According to the Heinz court, a rebuttal premised on the
presence of "structural barriers to collusion" in a merger to duopoly requires identification of barriers unique to the
industry under review and proof that tacit collusion is more difficult to achieve or maintain than in other industries.
12 The concentration levels in Heinz were quite high: the transaction was characterized by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a merger to duopoly, after which the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) would have
increased by 510 points to 5285. 13 But these concentration levels were not much higher than those found in Baker
Hughes (an increase in the HHI of 1425 points to 4303), where the merger was permitted to proceed. 14
The more substantial weight accorded concentration in Heinz relative to Baker Hughes appears to derive from a
special factor, the court's skepticism about the efficiency defense proffered by the merging firms, 15 and thus
should not be interpreted as a rejection of Baker Hughes or a reversion to a 1960s interpretation of the structural
presumption. When Baker Hughes was decided, the defense in that case, proof of ease of entry, was a wellestablished route to rebutting the prima facie case based on concentration. In contrast, the merging firms in Heinz
raised a less conventional rebuttal to the government's prima facie case, relying on evidence of efficiencies. "This is
a novel defense, which the Supreme Court has not addressed since the 1960s (and then, unfavorably) [citation
omitted] … and as to which the antitrust [*7] enforcement agencies have only recently clarified their views." 16
Once the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that the acceptance of that defense was
unwarranted, it was left with the inference of harm to competition arising from the reduction in the number of sellers.
Accordingly, Heinz is consistent with the modern cases that recognize that the structural presumption is rebuttable,
and that concentration matters along with other factors in determining whether competition will likely be harmed.

8

See FTC v. H.J. Heinz, Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C.Cir. 2001). Both authors were economic consultants to Heinz and Beech-Nut in
that case and, one of us (Baker) was the testifying expert economic witness. The views we are expressing in this memorandum
are our own, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of those companies.
9

10
11

Id. at 716 n.11.
Id. at 715, citing United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975).
Id. at 720-22.

12

See H.J. Heinz Co., supra note 8, at 724-25. Both Heinz and Baker Hughes take a decision-theoretic approach to merger
analysis, relying upon a concentration-based presumption that may be rebutted with contrary evidence regarding the structure,
conduct or performance of the market. Heinz is more explicit about the rebuttal, stating that when concentration is high, the
rebuttal evidence must compare this market to others. An interesting question raised by this framework is whether the rebuttal
factors should be viewed in combination or individually. That is, is it necessary that a single rebuttal factor be large enough by
itself to rebut the presumption? Or, is it sufficient for all the rebuttal factors taken together to be able to offset the presumption?
13

Id. at 716; see also id at 716 n.9 for a description of HHI.

14

See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 & n.3 (D.C.Cir. 1990).

15

The parties had argued that the efficiencies were an important reason that tacit collusion was unlikely, as they would make
the merged firm want to expand its market share at the industry leader's expense. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 724. Efficiencies were
also analyzed as an independent means of rebutting the government's prima facie case. Id. at 720-22.
16

See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 2000 WL 1741320, at 2 (D.C.Cir. 2000)(per curiam), rev'd, FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708
(D.C.Cir. 2001).
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The weight accorded concentration in that case appears to be more related to the ongoing development of the
doctrinal standards related to the efficiency defense than to any fundamental rethinking of the totality-of-thecircumstances approach to merger analysis as set forth in Baker Hughes.
Merger analysis under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines is similar to the modern approach of the courts.
Although higher market concentration surely has been associated with a greater likelihood of agency challenge, the
Merger Guidelines properly allow for the possibility that any merger would promote competition, even an acquisition
in a highly concentrated market. 17
III. Should concentration play a role in merger analysis?
The Task Force Mission Statement raises the question of whether market concentration is currently overused in
merger analysis. Task Force member Charles Weller even argues that judicial reliance on concentration as a factor
in predicting a merger's competitive effects is somehow inconsistent with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., which seeks to prevent courts from relying on "junk science" by regulating the admissibility of expert testimony.
18 In our view, the Merger Guidelines and the courts should not discard concentration, because modern [*8]
economics - both in theory and empirics - does not support the extreme claim that market concentration is
worthless as a guide to merger analysis.
First, economic theory does not suggest ignoring market shares and concentration in merger analysis. Although few
economists today would accept an older view defending the structural presumption based upon a relationship
between market concentration and industry economic profits, matters differ with respect to the thesis that
concentration is related to price. 19 In particular, a wide range of theories of oligopolistic conduct - both static and
dynamic (supergame) models of firm interaction - stand consistent with the view that fewer firms and more
concentrated markets on average are associated with higher prices. 20 In general, the smaller the number of firms,
the more likely that the firms will be able to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome at a higher-than-competitive
price, and the less likely that one firm will act as a "maverick" to limit or undermine that possibility. 21 Unilateral
price increases or output restraints also are more likely to be profitable when the merged firm has a higher market
share, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, a horizontal merger reducing the number of rivals from six significant firms to
five would be more likely to raise competitive concerns than one reducing the number from ten to nine, ceteris
paribus. 22
Second, the empirical evidence is consistent with a positive relationship between market concentration and price.
We readily acknowledge that the studies finding such a relationship are not perfect. They may not always define
markets properly, or adequately account for the reverse effect of price on concentration, for example. And, it

17

See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed.Reg. 41, 552 (1992).

18

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). To reach this result, Mr. Weller presumably would need to
subject the judges on the D.C. Circuit who decided Heinz (not the government's expert witness) to a Daubert hearing. See
generally Charles D. Weller, An Evolution of the Merger-JV Analysis: The Productivity Paradigm As A Positive Antitrust Policy for
Competitiveness and Prosperity, in ABA Antitrust Section, Perspectives on Fundamental Antitrust Theory (forthcoming 2001).
19

Thus, Ky Ewing's review of the infirm economic underpinnings of the concentration-profits relationship is beside the point
because it ignores the economic evidence supporting a relationship between concentration and price. See Ky P. Ewing, Jr., The
Soft Underbelly of Antitrust: Some Challenging Thoughts for the New Millennium, Antitrust Rep., Sept. 1999.
20

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1582
(1969).
21

See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion:Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the
Antitrust Laws (June 21, 2001)(unpublished manuscript).
22

Concentration can only be measured accurately if market definition has been performed properly. For this reason, as we
discuss further in the next section, we are concerned about market definition techniques that may tend to give concentration
statistics more prominence than they deserve.
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certainly is true that collusion does not occur in every highly concentrated market, while collusion does occur in
some markets that are not highly concentrated. Still, Professor Richard Schmalensee's 1989 summary remains a
proper [*9] interpretation of the empirical studies: "In cross-section comparisons involving markets in the same
industry, seller concentration is positively related to the level of price." 23
At the same time, we agree that contemporary economic learning does not view concentration as the unique or
necessarily even the dominant determinant of market price or the consequences of merger. The studies make it
clear that other industry-specific and market-specific factors beyond concentration are also important in determining
price and the competitive effects of mergers. 24 While a presumption based on market shares and concentration
has an economic basis, other factors are also important in determining the intensity of competition, including entry
conditions, the similarities or differences among firms and their products, the size of buyers, and others. 25
Moreover, the empirical research does not reliably identify any particular concentration level common across
industries at which price increases begin.
These caveats do not mean, however, that concentration is irrelevant. Studies have found that in some industries,
increases in concentration - particularly substantial ones - may generate large increases in prices. 26
Accordingly, contemporary economic learning on the relationship between market concentration and price suggests
that concentration be treated as an important factor relevant to the competitive effects analysis - one that is
appropriately considered in conjunction with other factors suggested by the competitive effects [*10] theory - but
far from an irrebuttable determinant of post-merger pricing. As previously noted, this is generally the way that the
Merger Guidelines handle concentration in merger analysis today.
IV. How can the Merger Guidelines and enforcement agency practice be improved?
We do not think that the economic evidence supports a wholesale revision of the Merger Guidelines that would
eliminate a role for concentration and market share. Market shares and concentration are relevant to the
determination of the competitive effects of mergers. These factors should not be discarded. High market
concentration does create a presumption that a merger between significant competitors will raise prices. However,
as discussed earlier, the presumption is far from conclusive. In the usual case, as the Merger Guidelines today
recognize, concentration should be one of several key factors in the analysis, along with the market shares of the
merging firms, ease of entry, other competitive effects factors, and likely efficiency benefits. 27
Moreover, an alternative approach to merger analysis that discards market concentration on grounds of irrelevance
to competitive effects analysis must necessarily, as a matter of logical consistency, also discard the current safe
harbors based on concentration (i.e. based on low HHI and low change in HHI). A belief that concentration is
irrelevant for predicting the anticompetitive effects of mergers also implies that low concentration also lacks

23

Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 Handbook of Industrial Organization 988
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig, eds., 1989) (Stylized Fact 5.1). Thus, we think that Harris and Smith overstate the
criticisms of market structure as a predictor of the harm from merger. Barry C. Harris & David D. Smith, The Merger Guidelines
vs. Economics: A Survey of Economic Studies, Antitrust Rep., Sept. 1999. See also Ky P. Ewing, Jr., The Soft Underbelly of
Antitrust:Some Challenging Thoughts for the New Millennium, Antitrust Rep., Sept. 1999.
24

See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW (Supp.1999).

25

Id.

26

For example, the results reported in Timothy F. Bresnahan & Valerie Y. Suslow, Oligopoly Pricing with Capacity Constraints,
15/16 Annales D'Economie et de Statistique 267-89 (1989) suggest that a merger in the North American aluminum industry
during the 1960s and 1970s would have led to a price increase of 2.7% during cyclical downturns for every 100 point increase in
the HHI. Similarly, the FTC's econometric evidence showed that the proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot - which
would have reduced the number of firms from three to two in some markets and two to one in others - would have raised price
on average by about 8%. Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. Pub. Pol'y & Mktg. 11 (1999).
27

See generally Merger Guidelines, supra note 17.
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predictive value. Thus, if concentration is made irrelevant to predicting the competitive effects of horizontal mergers,
there similarly is no intelligible basis for giving a free pass to mergers in unconcentrated markets or to acquisitions
of small rivals. 28 We expect that making this the quid pro quo for further downplaying the importance of high
concentration would be highly controversial, though it is necessary as a matter of logical consistency.
While we are great fans of the Merger Guidelines, we do not mean to suggest that agency practice cannot be
improved. We recognize that striking the right balance between adopting readily administrable decision rules and
ensuring a full economic analysis is difficult. In doing so, there are important benefits - premised in the economics of
decision theory - of relying on rebuttable presumptions based on easily [*11] observable information. 29 Yet, we
worry that the courts and enforcement agencies may read Heinz as a license to depend too heavily on the short cut
of basing decisions primarily on market concentration when a more complete competitive effects analysis would be
practical and would potentially lead to a different answer.
For these reasons, it may be useful to clarify the role of concentration analysis in the Merger Guidelines. But if the
Task Force proceeds down this road, we do not think that it is necessary or productive to start on a clean slate. The
Merger Guidelines provide a useful and robust analytic framework that has successfully been revised over time to
incorporate developments in industrial organization economics and business strategy analysis. Any effort to clarify
the role of market shares and market concentration in merger analysis should approach that project with the goal of
proposing amendments to the existing Merger Guidelines, not a total rewrite. The revisions should not deny a role
for market concentration. Instead, they should more carefully determine and explain the appropriate strength of the
concentration presumption on the basis of decision theoretic considerations. Such a clarification also promises to
be influential in helping courts apply Baker Hughes in the wake of Heinz.
Beyond clarifying the role of the structural presumption, we have other suggestions for revising the Merger
Guidelines and improving enforcement agency practice. First, we are concerned about the way that concentration
and market shares are used in unilateral effects analysis. The significance of increases in market concentration
from any particular merger depends upon the type of competitive effect theory advanced in that case. Concentration
matters least in predicting the consequence of an acquisition when the competitive concern involves the loss of
localized competition among sellers of differentiated products. This is the "unilateral" competitive effects theory that
properly has come to play a major role in merger analysis at the federal enforcement agencies during the past
decade. 30 In this situation, market shares and concentration matter primarily to the extent that market shares are
related to diversion ratios or demand cross-elasticities.
The "small but significant and nontransitory increase in price" (ssnip) test for market definition and the companion
role of the HHI in the 1982 Guidelines were formulated in the context of the analysis of coordinated effects that
might increase prices above a pre-merger price benchmark. The 1982 Merger Guidelines paid little attention to
unilateral effects analysis or the maintenance of pre-merger prices over [*12] time. The 1992 Merger Guidelines,
by contrast, updated merger analysis based on modern industrial organization economics and, therefore, gave
greater focus and importance to unilateral effects analysis. 31 However, it did so in the context of these other
concepts. It is now widely accepted among economists that unilateral effects analysis does not strictly require a
single discrete relevant market to be defined with the ssnip test; demand elasticities and diversion ratios are
sufficient.

28

Indeed, there is a strong case that concentration should play little or no role in the analysis of the unilateral competitive effects
of mergers among sellers of differentiated products, and thus that there should be no concentration safe harbor for mergers
when such effects are alleged.
29

For a recent analysis of the role of decision theory in setting antitrust standards, see C. Frederick Becker III & Steven C.
Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999).
30

31

See Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21 (Spring, 1997).

Compare U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed.Reg. 28, 493; 28,
497 (1982) with 57 Fed.Reg. 41, 552 (1992).
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Market definition is useful mainly because it may permit rough inferences of diversion ratios from market shares
when better evidence of demand elasticities is unavailable. 32 Accordingly, we think that the Merger Guidelines
should explain more carefully the proper role of diversion ratios, demand elasticities, and relevant market definition
in unilateral effects analysis, so that economically extraneous arguments about market definition and concentration
can be avoided in the analysis of unilateral competitive effects of mergers among sellers of differentiated products.
For similar reasons, we recommend that the Merger Guidelines remove any suggestion of a 35% market share
"safe harbor" (referring to the sum of the shares of the merging firms) in the evaluation of the possibility of unilateral
competitive effects among firms selling differentiated products.
Second, conventional market definition techniques also may tend to give concentration statistics more prominence
than they deserve. In particular, the "smallest market" principle in the Merger Guidelines at section 1.11 is
problematic. 33 The problem is that any market within which competition would likely be harmed - smallest or not is a market in which a merger should be reviewed. 34 In our view, this problem is only imperfectly addressed by the
discretion the Merger Guidelines provide to use a larger than usual ssnip. We thus recommend that the "smallest
market principle" be deleted entirely from the Merger Guidelines.
Third, the Merger Guidelines' focus on defining markets based upon a ssnip above the prevailing price level also
can be problematic in some cases. This "price up" ssnip test is not tied to the relevant competitive concern in
certain matters. It frequently works, but it may mislead the enforcement agencies into thinking that there [*13] can
be no competitive problem (because the relevant market appears large and market concentration appears low)
when in fact the actual competitive problem is that the merger will deter a price decrease. 35 Under such
circumstances, a market definition approach based on increases in price beginning from a lower, more competitive
level, could lead to a more narrow market that generates market shares better reflective of competitive conditions.
In our view, this problem is only partially and imperfectly addressed by the Merger Guidelines suggested at section
1.11 that market definition start with a price more reflective of the lower competitive price when "premerger
circumstances are strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction," or start with a lower price when a lower future
price - absent the merger - "can be predicted with reasonable reliability." 36 We therefore recommend that the
Merger Guidelines more carefully clarify the relationship between the market definition pricing test and the
competitive effects being evaluated in order to reduce the likelihood of falling into the numerous variations of the
Cellophane fallacy. 37
Fourth, we are concerned that the agencies sometimes have been overly dismissive of efficiency claims. The
agencies are right to subject such claims to careful review, as efficiency claims may well be overstated and the
benefits often may be achieved as a practical matter by unilateral action or cooperation short of merger. But that
review should be undertaken with a recognition that efficiencies often are the motive for merger - and may well be
so even in a concentrated market - and should not be premised on the presumption that efficiency claims are
nothing more than a game of "trust me" played by fundamentally untrustworthy firms. 38 In this regard, while the

32

Market definition also is used to apply the Merger Guidelines safe harbors based on HHI levels and increases.

33

See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, at 1.1.

34

For example, a conclusion that Staples, Office Depot and Office Max participate in an "office superstore" market, because a
hypothetical office superstore chain monopolist could profitably raise price, does not imply that Wal-Mart places no significant
pricing constraints on these stores or that a Wal-Mart/Staples merger would not have anticompetitive effects.
35

For an example of a merger where the court found that the acquisition would have harmed competition by causing prices to
decline less rapidly than they would have absent the transaction, see FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C.Cir. 1997); See
also Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187
(2000).
36

See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 33.

37

See U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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recent Heinz decision demanded a "rigorous analysis" of claimed efficiencies when market concentration was high,
and found the proffered efficiencies insufficient in that case, it nevertheless accepted that sufficiently large
efficiencies, if [*14] proven, could overcome even the presumption of anticompetitive effect that arises from a
merger reducing the number of sellers to a duopoly. 39
V. Would Porter's "Five Forces" analysis do better?
Charles Weller has suggested that the use of Professor Michael Porter's "five forces" typology would permit courts
and enforcers to do a better job of identifying the competitive effects of mergers than does the use of the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. 40 We strongly disagree. All the economic forces addressed in Professor Porter's typology are
also addressed through the Merger Guidelines - not surprisingly given that Professor Porter's work and the Merger
Guidelines both draw on the same body of industrial organization economics theory. Thus, an analyst applying
Professor Porter's framework with sensitivity to the underlying economics would almost surely end up evaluating
the merger similarly to the analysis under the Merger Guidelines, including consideration of market concentration.
As Professor Porter himself recognized in comments that were excised from published transcript excerpts, "skilled
practitioners that understand competition can get it right." 41 For example, at the Task Force's Roundtable
Conference, Professor Porter agreed that the concentration increase from a merger in a six firm industry (roughly
an increase in the HHI from 1667 to 2000) was a "perfectly legitimate threshold" for antitrust enforcers [*15] "to get
concerned about," and, in excised comments, agreed that "a dominant competitor should face a higher standard."
42

To the extent those approaches differ, moreover, an analysis based directly on Professor Porter's framework likely
would be less effective than the Merger Guidelines analysis for antitrust purposes. This is because the Merger
Guidelines have been written to apply economic learning to the specific problems of antitrust merger analysis. In
contrast, Professor Porter's framework is aimed at addressing a broader range of business strategy problems.
Thus, we do not think that it makes sense to revise the Merger Guidelines by adopting the "five forces" framework.
Professor Porter also did not indicate that either his framework or his experience as a business strategy consultant
called for a substantial loosening of merger policy. To the contrary, at the task force symposium, in comments that
were excised from the published transcript excerpts, Professor Porter was highly skeptical of claims that mergers
generally lead to substantial efficiencies. He pointed out that mergers have a low success rate and suggested that
reducing the number of significant rivals in a market is more likely to reduce competition than to increase it.
Because of this skepticism, along with his view that competition is a key driver of innovation, Professor Porter
38

A role of the HHI safe harbors is to balance presumed efficiencies from typical mergers against the likelihood of mergerinduced incentives for price increases. Given this role, a less skeptical enforcement agency attitude toward efficiencies in
individual cases would require a downward adjustment in the general concentration safe harbors in order to maintain policy
neutrality.
39

See H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720-22.

40

Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (1980); see also Charles D.
Weller, An Evolution of the Merger-JV Analysis: The Productivity Paradigm As A Positive Antitrust Policy for Competitiveness
and Prosperity, in ABA Antitrust Section, Perspectives on Fundamental Antitrust Theory (forthcoming 2001).
41

Roundtable Conference Transcript (Jan. 11, 2001) at 76 (not included in edited transcript). Porter's five forces relate to the
Merger Guidelines as follows: Porter's threat of substitution includes what the Merger Guidelines address in market definition
(demand substitution) and identification of market participants (for uncommitted entry, or supply substitution). Porter's threat of
entry is addressed in the entry analysis section of the Merger Guidelines for committed entry, and the identification of market
participants for uncommitted entry. What Porter refers to as the bargaining power of buyers is considered in the Guidelines in the
competitive effects analysis and also as a factor affecting the likelihood of entry. Porter's bargaining power of suppliers is also
relevant to a Guidelines competitive effects analysis. Finally, what Porter terms the intensity of rivalry among existing
competitors could be understood as the market concentration and competitive effects analyses of the Merger Guidelines.
42

Roundtable Conference Transcript (Jan.11, 2001) at 68-69 (not included in edited transcript), 115-16 (included in edited
transcript).
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suggested that mergers should be prevented if they even lead to an anticompetitive outcome with a probability as
low as 20%. If careful analysis shows that the probability of a "bad outcome" is "greater than … 0.2," Porter
declared in excised comments, then "I would say stop" to the merger absent "a pretty compelling counterargument
in terms of the productivity benefits." 43 Thus, Porter "would tend to make the [concentration] threshold low" in
merger analysis: "Going from three to two [firms] is extremely risky," and a reduction in the number of firms from six
to five is "a perfectly legitimate threshold to get concerned about." 44 Concentration is not "the definitive test" for
Porter, but he indicated in excised comments that "we have to have a concentration standard" that would be stated
"in terms of … any segment of the business." 45 If anything, therefore, Professor Porter's views would call [*16]
for tightening the concentration standards used in merger enforcement, not relaxing the structural presumption.
*
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43

Roundtable Conference Transcript (Jan. 11, 2001) at 97 (not included in edited transcript).

44

Roundtable Conference Transcript (Jan. 11, 2001) at 113-16 (partially included in edited transcript).

45

Roundtable Conference Transcript (Jan. 11, 2001) at 113-14 (not included in edited transcript). Porter explained that a
concentration standard is required "because that gives us a tremendous certain definition of [whether] you're going to have an
issue," and thus whether "the second stage of the analysis," which looks at "broader factors," should "kick[] in." Id. In the second
stage, "the productivity … benefits have to be weighted against the health of competition, because if there is not healthy
competition then the [productivity gain] is not going to get passed on." Id.

